While new conventional wisdom warns that developing countries should be aware of the risks of premature capital account liberalization, the costs of not removing exchange controls have received much less attention. This paper investigates the negative effects of exchange controls on trade. To minimize evasion of controls, countries often intensify inspections at the border and increase documentation requirements. Thus, the cost of conducting trade rises. The paper finds that a one standard-deviation increase in the controls on trade payment has the same negative effect on trade as an increase in tariff by about 14 percentage points. A one standard-deviation increase in the controls on FX transactions reduces trade by the same amount as a rise in tariff by 11 percentage points. Therefore, the collateral damage in terms of foregone trade is sizable.
I. Introduction
Since the emerging market crisis of the 1990s, a new conventional wisdom has emerged that developing countries should be alert to the adverse effects of premature capital account liberalizations (see Rodrik, 1998; Stiglitz, 2002 ; and other papers reviewed by Prasad, Rogoff, Wei, and Kose, 2003) . In comparison, the costs of not removing exchange controls have received much less attention in empirical research. A notable exception is a study by Forbes (2002) which estimated the effect of Chile's capital controls ("encaje") in the early 1990s on the cost of borrowing faced by its medium-sized publicly-listed firms.
In this paper, we estimate another possible collateral damage of exchange controls, namely their effects on international trade, and compare them to those of tariff and other non-tariff barriers (NTBs). The study was motivated in part by a conversation we had some years ago with the chief of the national foreign exchange control administration of a country which shall remain anonymous. As the country was on a fixed exchange rate regime (and any change in the regime was to be decided by the government cabinet rather than by the foreign exchange control administration) and by then had permitted current account convertibility of its currency, we asked the chief why his bureau needed to have a large staff nationally. The response was that it was common for firms and individuals to try to circumvent capital account restrictions by mis-invoicing imports, exports or both, and his staff had to implement various inspections to minimize such leakages. It dawned on us that attempts to enforce exchange controls have most likely raised the cost for firms to engage in exports and imports.
How much extra cost these controls effectively impose on international trade is the subject of the current research reported here. Wincoop (2003) and Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2005) .
To our knowledge, Tamirisa (1999) was the first and the only other paper that studied the effect of exchange restrictions on trade. Due to data limitation, her sample covers only one year (1996) and 40 countries. Perhaps more importantly, the estimation was based on a misspecified model as it did not incorporate separate importer and exporter fixed effects which are required of by economic theory. For example, Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) show that the omission of these fixed effects has artificially generated the so-called "border effect" in trade volume. Subramanian and Wei (forthcoming) show that the inclusion of the fixed effects can reverse Rose's (2004) conclusion on the ineffectiveness of the WTO in promoting trade. It is therefore important to specify the trade volume equation in a way that is consistent with economic theories.
Due to the comprehensive descriptions of the exchange controls in the AREAER database since 1996, we are able to construct separate indicators for (a) controls on proceeds from exports and payments for imports, (b) controls on capital transactions, and (c) controls on foreign exchange (FX) transactions and other items not specific to goods trade or capital transactions. Note that the phrases "capital controls" and "exchange controls" are used interchangeably in this paper as they refer to all three categories of controls, not just those on capital transactions. A narrower definition of "capital controls" may include only controls on capital transactions plus controls on most FX transactions. According to Johnson, Kochhar, Mitton and Tamirisa (2006) , several capital control measures adopted in Malaysia during the Asian financial crisis were not targeted at specific capital transactions, but at all FX transactions.
To preview the main findings, we will report economically and statistically significant evidence of negative effects of exchange controls on trade. In particular, a one standard deviation increase in the controls on export receipts and import payments is found to have the same negative effect on trade as an increase in tariff by 8.7 to 13.9 percentage points, depending on the model specifications. A one standard deviation increase in the controls on FX transactions reduces trade by the same amount as a rise in tariff by 10.8 to 11.3 percentage points. When a case study of the emerging markets during 1996-99 is examined, we find that those countries with greater increases in the controls on capital transactions also experienced greater falls in their trade (after taking into account their output contractions). To summarize, exchange controls effectively work as a form of non-tariff barriers to trade even though they have not been typically characterized as NTBs in the literature. We conclude that the collateral damage of imposing exchange controls in terms of foregone trade is sizable.
The paper is arranged as follows. Section II describes some basic patterns regarding the exchange controls across countries and over time. Section III presents the statistical analysis.
Section IV Concludes.
II. Exchange Controls: Some Basic Patterns
The IMF's AREAER database uses up to 192 indicators -listed in an appendix -to track the exchange controls for individual member countries from 1996. We divide these controls into three broad categories and construct an index for each category. Each index ranges from 0 to 1, reflecting the proportion of the indicators in each category that have controls in place. The three categories are:
• Controls on payments for imports and proceeds from exports. They cover 35 controls that explicitly target transactions related to international trade, including requirements for a foreign exchange budget for imports, and documentation and financing requirements for import payments and export proceeds.
• Controls on capital transactions. They cover 86 controls on transactions of capital and money market instruments, derivatives, FDI, credit operations, real estates, and personal finance. They also include controls on the operation of institutional investors and commercial banks.
• Controls on FX transactions and other items that are not exclusively on trade or capital transactions. They include exchange taxes and subsidies, ban on currency derivative trading, controls on bank accounts, currency requirements for pricing and settlements, current transfers and invisible transactions, and trade in gold and banknotes. The index for controls on trade payments, and that for FX transactions, also declined from 0.30 to 0.24, and from 0.35 to 0.31, respectively, during the same period. Countries with more controls in one category are also likely to have more controls in the other categories, as indicated by the pair wise correlations of about 0.67-0.76 (Table 1b) .
The average values of the indices mask substantial cross-country heterogeneity and timeseries variations for many countries. To illustrate this point, Figure 2 indicator, the intensity of the controls is not well captured by the database. In light of these shortcomings, the statistical findings should be interpreted with caution. Nonetheless, the AREAER database may be the only source that covers the near universe of the countries and codes the controls in a consistent way across countries.
III. Statistical Analysis
We now turn to the regression analysis. Starting with an explanation of the benchmark specification and the data on tariffs and non-tariff barriers, we move to reporting some basic results and computing the tariff equivalents of the exchange controls. We then discuss a number of extensions including a case study of the emerging markets' experience during the financial crisis episode of the late 1990s. 
The dependent variable , , (2005), we also include a Mills ratio and another HMR variable to correct for the non-random presence of zero trade and intra-sector firm heterogeneity.
The importer and exporter fixed effects are meant to capture the "remoteness" terms in Wei (1996) or the "multilateral resistance" terms in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) . Note, however, that we are not able to include time-varying country fixed effects as that will render it impossible to identify the effects of exchange controls (which are part of the time-varying country-specific factors). As an extension, we will use a specification that includes timevarying import-price index for exporters and importers separately. In addition, we will examine a specification that includes (non-time-varying) country-pair fixed effects which are also more general than the importer/exporter fixed effects.
Data
The sample includes 142 countries for which information about trade flows, tariff rates, the nontariff barrier index, and exchange controls are available. A list of these countries is provided in Appendix 2. As will be clear, this paper concludes that many of the exchange controls are effectively non-tariff barriers in terms of their effects on trade. However, conventionally measured NTBs in the literature do not usually include exchange controls.
For comparison, we adopt a separate measure of the NTBs in the traditional sense of the phrase based on the IMF's Trade Restrictiveness Index database. The index takes a value of 1, 2 or 3, depending on the coverage ratio or other dimensions of non-tariff barriers to trade.
According to the IMF (2005), the index takes the value of one if NTBs are absent or minor in a country (i.e., less than one percent of production or trade are subject to NTBs). A rating of 2 implies that NTBs are significant, applied to at least one important sector, and affecting up to 25 percent of production or trade. A rating of 3 means that NTBs are relevant for many sectors or an entire stages of production, affecting more than 25 percent of production or trade. In the IMF database, the NTB index takes the value of 2 for a large number of countryyears. So a rise in the index's value from one to two, or from two to three, represents a fairly significant increase in the extent of non-tariff barriers.
The tariff rate for a given country pair in a given year is a simple average of the applicable tariff rates across all tariff lines for that importer and that specific trading partner (so that members of a free trade area would face different tariffs from non-members).
Benchmark results
We now turn to the regression results which are reported in Table 2 . The first three regressions include the three exchange control indices one by one. The controls on trade payments have a strong adverse effect on trade. The point estimate for γ is -0.57, and is highly significant. The coefficient for controls on capital transactions is negative but insignificant. The estimate for controls on FX transactions is -0.31 and significant at the 10 percent level. Note that all standard errors are clustered by importer-exporter country pairs 2 .
Most other regressors are significant and with intuitive signs. In particular, the estimate for tariff rates is -0.71 and highly significant, which implies that increasing tariff by 10
percentage points is associated with a 7.1 percent reduction in trade. The estimate for NTB index is -0.22 and also highly significant. This implies that a one-step increase in the NTB index would have equivalent effect on trade as a 30 percentage points increase in tariff rates.
GDP, distance, dummies for border, colonial ties, and common language are all significant and consistent with the previous literature. Trade between two WTO members is about 38 percent higher, while the trade between a WTO member and a non-member is about 17 percent lower.
Column 4 in Table 2 provides estimates when all three restriction indices are included in one regression. The point estimate for the controls on trade payments remains significant at -0.54.
Controls on capital transactions is still insignificant. The coefficient for FX transactions became insignificant, although it still shows a negative sign. Estimates for all other variables are virtually unchanged.
The model allows us to conduct a tariff equivalent calculation for the exchange controls.
Take Column 4 in The results from this alternative specification, reported in Table 3 , are mostly consistent with the benchmark case. When the restriction indices are included individually, all three types of controls have negative and significant coefficients. When they are included collectively, both controls on trade payments and those on FX transactions remain significant, while controls on capital transactions become insignificant. The point estimate for controls on trade payments is -0.49, implying slightly larger effect than those in the benchmark regressions.
The coefficients for tariff rates are estimated to be about -0.72, close to those in the benchmark regressions. These estimates imply a tariff equivalent of 13 percentage points for a one-standard-deviation increase in the controls on trade payments, and 14 percentage points for a similar increase in the controls on FX transactions. In the last column of Table 3 , (nontime-varying) contry-pair fixed effects as well as time-varying imported goods price indices for exporters and importers are included in the same regression. With this specification, the controls on trade payments still have a negative and significant coefficient, though the coefficient on controls on foreign exchange transactions becomes negative and insignificant.
For some reasons, the coefficient on controls on capital transactions becomes positive and significant. It is worth noting that the last column represents a fairly demanding specification with many more parameters to be estimated relative to the regressions in Columns 1-4 of Table 3 .
Developing countries
There are reasons to think that the same exchange controls may have a smaller negative effect on trade for developing countries than for developed countries. For example, bribery and corruption at the customs may be more prevalent in developing countries so that a given conrol is easier to be evaded. On the other hand, trading firms in developing countries may have a harder time than their counterparts in developed countries in obtaining trade credit to overcome the exchange controls. In this case, the same exchange controls may have a larger negative effect. This discussion suggests that it may be useful to check if the results for developing countries are different for the whole sample. The regression results are reported in Table 6 . As in the benchmark case, we place the controls indices one by one first, and then pool them together. For each model, we implement two variations, one with separate importer and exporter fixed effects, and the other with country pair fixed effects. Many sub-indices show a negative sign, suggesting a tradereducing effect. Some sub-categories are significant for all specifications, such as controls on export proceeds, controls on setting up bank accounts, existence of arrears due to lack of FX, and currency requirements for pricing/settlements. It is particularly noteworthy that controls over transactions of capital and money market instruments (including equity and bond investments) have negative and significant signs in the models with importer and exporter fixed effect. One caveat for the regressions with a large number of restriction sub-categories is that some of them are highly correlated with each others, making statistical inference difficult. For example, the average pair-wise correlation among the 8 indices for capital transactions is 0.6. Therefore, the estimates need to be interpreted with caution.
A case study of the emerging market experiences in the 1990s
To supplement the full-sample analysis, we now turn to a case study of the experiences of some emerging market economies that tightened exchange controls during the Asian-Latin American financial crisis of the late 1990s. As the increases in the controls were primarily motivated by a desire to stop capital outflows or otherwise reduce the chance of a speculative attack on their currencies, the changes in the controls were arguably exogenous with respect to the countries' trade flows.
We would like to work with a group of countries for which international capital flows are significant relative to their GDPs (at least prior to the crisis). Therefore, we start with a set of countries that are included in the MSCI emerging market index, and narrow down the list to those developing economies that raised controls on either capital transactions or FX transactions during 1996-1999. We are left with 11 countries (marked by # in Appendix 2).
As it turns out, very few of them significantly altered their tariffs, NTB ratings, or even controls on trade payments during the period. Therefore, on an ex ante basis, we do not have much hope in identifying a significant effect of these three variables. Nonetheless, we hope to identify some effects coming from changes in the controls on capital and FX transactions.
We implement a time-differenced version of Equation (1), with the change in log bilateral imports from 1996 to 1999 as the dependent variable. Naturally, all variables that are timeinvariant are eliminated, including the various fixed effects. Our specification is:
where ∆ denotes a change in the relevant variable from 1996 to 1999. The regression result without the NTB variable is reported in the first column of Table 7 . The coefficient for the controls on capital transactions is -1.46 and significant at the five percent level, and that for the controls on FX transactions is -1.28 and significant. As expected, the coefficients on tariff rate and controls on trade payments are not statistically different from zero. Note that a fall in imports due to a contraction of domestic demand is explicitly controlled for since the change in an importer's GDP is a regressor. In the second column, we add change in the NTB ratings as an extra regressor and obtain broadly similar results. To account for the effects of 
Notes:
Robust standard errors, clustered by country pairs, are in parentheses R-squares in the last 4 columns do not include the explanatory power of the country pair dummies. Table 2 are also included but not reported.
2/ R-squares in the last three columns do not account for the explanatory power of the country-pair fixed effects. 
